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WATER POLLUTION AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
By Carl Blair Housley* 
While single manufacturing plants are dumping millions of 
gallons of contaminated water into streams and lakes daily, a 
deluge of complaints of malodorous conditions, fish kills, and other 
damages are simultaneously being registered to government officials 
who possess little authority to assist injured citizens. Of those 
agencies being contacted, the Federal Water Quality Office (WQO)l 
is the most potent of some thirty agencies based in Washington, 
D.C., all of which share the avowed goal of abatement of impure 
discharges into the nation's waters. WQO officers have chosen to 
impose uniform water quality standards upon all states and to 
enforce compliance of polluters when rules are violated. In antic-
ipation of legal action, water treatment plants have been installed 
at selected private sites and municipal water works. Government 
grants to partially defray building costs, in addition, are available 
to city officials who desire to construct purification facilities for 
sewage treatment. 
Although water pollution legislation dates back to the Refuse 
Act of 1899, determined efforts to reduce the flow of impurities 
into streams were not considered to be threatening by industrial 
violators until the early sixties. In the past, most of us did not 
question the correctness of the idea that malodorous conditions 
meant larger local payrolls. Further, we were certain that water 
was not scarce, and we believed that industrial managers would 
close their plants and move elsewhere if an attempt were made to 
enforce purification. Now, however, the explanation that polluted 
streams are accompanied by gainful jobs is no longer sufficient. The 
enforcement of ambient and effluent water quality standards has 
not caused industrial relocations in large numbers. 
Economists point out that water is indeed a valuable resource 
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due to its increasing scarcity. Furthermore, they explain that it is 
irrelevant to defend polluting activity on the basis of employment 
generated because an equal or greater amount of jobs might be-
come available if the contamination of waters were stopped. It is 
the sale of goods which creates work, not the disposal of waste 
products. In fact, by depositing deleterious substances into streams, 
lakes, or aquifers, polluters often create external diseconomies, 
which are social costs borne by persons other than the damaging 
party. These social costs are an example of the failure of the market 
system to function properly. There is no mechanism, short of a 
system of direct enforced compensation, which will correct this 
situation in which one individual absorbs costs created by another. 
In other words, in the absence of legal requirements that enforce 
lower levels of discharges, the damaging party will not be bound 
to abate his outflow of wastes unless he is influenced by his down-
stream neighbor. In lieu of a bargain2 involving a mutually bene-
ficial trade of goods, services, or money for less pollution there 
would be no means of achieving the desired end. Legislation suf-
ficiently powerful to enjoin the polluter would be necessary for 
successful abatement. But as previously implied, statutes such as 
the Refuse Act may be ignored unless strictly enforced. 
An industrial manager who makes a decision to move his plant 
to avoid pollution standards is either a financial expert, an impul-
sive mover, or uninformed. Although water quality standards will 
be relatively uniform from state to state, cost differences will remain 
which can be detected by an alert analyst. Moreover, these diver-
gencies could be sufficiently great to justify transferring the plant. 
In most cases no move to avoid abatement enforcement could be 
justified in financial terms. 
Much of the testimony before the Committee on Public Works 
during the last few years provides strong evidence that statements 
made were based on personal interest rather than compelling 
economic logic. Changes in federal law reflect pressures from state 
and local officials and industrialists who wanted larger federal hand-
outs accompanied by less federal control. Conservationist groups 
agreed that construction grants should be increased, but they 
strongly urged that the federal government accelerate enforcement 
action. 3 The pristine purity which many conservationists desire is 
not technically feasible at present; further, federal subsidies usually 
lead to a misallocation of resources. The latter consideration is 
crucial in that it deals with the placement of productive factors. 
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When resources (factors of production) are misdirected, the out-
put or product of the economy falls short of the maximum amount 
producible. If misallocation, or the employment of human or non-
human resources in inappropriate work, increased, real national 
income would decline. As income falls, unemployment usually 
increases and a depression or recession occurs. Under ideal condi-
tions, a better allocation of factors would result if the market econ-
omy were allowed to function without intervention. External dis-
economies, however, provide instances of misdirection of resources, 
the improvement of which often requires outside intervention. 
This does not imply that water pollution will necessarily cause the 
economy to decline. Nor is it intended to express the favorability of 
government controls. To th, contrary, there is a strong argument 
for free enterprise, but in this particular case, the problem of 
allocation of social costs cannot be solved without an organized 
effort. As previously stated, the market system fails to remedy such 
problems of disequilibrium, and there is no incentive which leads 
to payment of compensation to injured persons. Consequently, 
any incentive must be supplied externally by legislation. 
WATER QUALITY LAW 
Apparently, the widespread citizen disapproval of water pollu-
tion prompted elected officials to formulate laws which at least 
represent a token effort to reduce the rate of discharge of wastes 
into public streams, lakes, and aquifers. Although college students 
have recently contributed to the acceleration of legal processes by 
protesting the degradation of environmental components, action 
was initiated years before this particular objection came into vogue 
on campus. Before World War II, government policy on a national 
scale was grounded on three major pieces of legislation: (1) the 
aforementioned Refuse Act of 1899, (2) the Public Health Service 
Act of 1912, and (3) the Oil Pollution Act of 1924. Recognition of 
the ineffectiveness of early laws and the need to abate water pollu-
tion led Congress to pass the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. 
This legislation did little more than encourage persons, firms, 
states, and municipalities not to decrease the value of interstate 
streams by dumping wastes into them. Amendments to the Act in 
1956 and 1961 dealt with the distribution of federal monies to 
individual states on the basis of poverty and population, states' 
rights in controlling pollution, and the duty of the Secretary 
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of Health, Education, and Welfare to request that the Attorney 
General bring suit on behalf of the United States against unco-
operative polluters. In other words, funds were made available to 
local governments by the federal government, but federal suits 
could be filed only with the permission of state officials. 
Although it is true that specialized agencies were established and 
financial aid provided for the construction of treatment· plants, 
very little enforcement was accomplished. As previously implied, 
the power of the Attorney General to bring suit against polluting 
individuals or industries was neutralized by the provision requir-
ing permission of the governor or other officials of the affected state 
as a prerequisite to legal action. Although in most cases pollution 
caused damage in the state in which it was discharged, state officials 
often hesitated to permit legal action for several reasons. First, it 
could be politically disastrous for a governor to allow the initiation 
of abatement proceedings against a powerful person or industry 
operating within the boundaries of his home state. Second, it was 
considered that avoiding enforcement action could work as an 
incentive attracting other water-using firms to locate within the 
state, thus increasing employment and tax revenues. Third, it was 
considered desirable to increase production in absolute terms 
without regard for ensuing costs or the net change in revenues. 
Industrial managers might be willing to sacrifice minor ad-
vantages available elsewhere in order to avoid the costs of purifying 
their effluents. Inducements offered by local or state governments 
in the form of industrial pollution rights would clearly conflict 
with federal policies for improving the quality of the nation's 
waters and of increasing income and employment by promoting 
a better allocation of resources. Therefore, it seems that legal pro-
visions requiring state approval prior to enforcement litigation 
would not be in the public interest. Moreover, the giving of federal 
monies to local authorities does not guarantee an improvement of 
water quality. Past legislation brought about no significant changes 
in contamination practices except in cases of municipalities in 
which government funds were used to construct water treatment 
plants. 
The Water Quality Act of 1965 created the WQO and authorized 
the promulgation of uniform water quality standards throughout 
the United States.4 In 1966, the Clean Water Restoration Act au-
thorized greater amounts of money for local grants, and amended 
the Oil Pollution Act to cover only grossly negligent or willful oil 
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spills.5 It is important to note that in 1966 authority to control 
polluters was moved from the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare to the Department of the Interior, the latter being 
an agency originally formed to regulate resources in such a way that 
depletion or usage would yield a maximum gain. 
During concurrent years, testimony before the Committee on 
Public Works furnished excellent examples of the art of avoiding 
relevant economic issues while mentioning the 'economic' effects 
of federal legislation.6 Without properly explaining the rationale 
underlying their statements, speakers complained of the injustice 
of federally imposed quality standards while they praised federal 
grants and tax incentives to municipalities, states, and industry. 
ROLE OF ECONOMISTS 
It is apparent that such arbitrary opinions could be beneficially 
evaluated and policy suggestions better formulated by able econo-
mists. Specialists could identify deceptive statements and evaluate 
them, rather than add them to the law without proper scrutiny.7 
For example, a competent economist would readily recognize that 
rigidities result from uniform standards, and, contrary to the beliefs 
of many witnesses, that federal grants and tax incentives are often 
detrimental to the economy. Nevertheless, tax incentives for the 
installation of pollution abatement equipment were passed in 
1969.8 Some economists argue that the unavoidable discrimination 
in levies imposed by government causes a misdirection of scarce 
resources. This misallocation, added to the damages resulting from 
pollution, they believe, will lead to social costs in excess of any 
benefits resulting from tax exemptions. 
Whereas standards impose undue economic distortions, legisla-
tion such as the Water Pollution Control Act has not arranged 
for other, more appropriate techniques for abatement of impure 
discharges. In addition, the Clean Water Restoration Act allowed 
the continuation of negligent contamination from oil spills with-
out compensation. Oil spills and ineffective statutes are obviously 
detrimental to the economy, but too strict pollution guidelines 
could create costs which are greater than benefits resulting from 
the adoption of such policies. An appropriate alternative to those 
provisions would include laws formulated with substance adequate 
for abatement without the imposition of severe resource usage 
restrictions on a nationwide basis. Constraints should be loosened 
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and legislation strengthened if a strict system of compensation is to 
be practiced. The imposition of liability on the polluter in an 
amount equal to the burden which he is shifting to other members 
of society could serve as an incentive to reduce his impure effluents 
or to install treatment facilities, either of which would have favor-
able effects. The employment of this legal-economic device would 
result in more purification equipment where compensation is 
prohibitive and would lead to an intense search for efficient treat-
ment methods. Economists have suggested that payments could be 
direct between defendant and plaintiff or channeled through 
government offices. Both schemes, if enforced, would be effective in 
controlling pollution, and each possesses the flexibility necessary 
for a relatively smooth-running economy.9 
In addition to gathering data to support or negate their hypo-
thetical solutions, economists should carefully explain their opposi-
tion to particular policies. The policies contained in the Clean 
Water Restoration Act of 1966 which protect oil producers whose 
spills are merely negligent,lO and the policies which advocate 
increased local control, should be opposed on the grounds that 
neither policy is commensurate with the national public interest. 
The effect of mixing oil with water is the same, economically and 
environmentally, whether intrusion occurs by accident or inten-
tionally. Moreover, accidental dumping can be insured against, 
making liability for negligent acts eminently reasonable. Econo-
mists favor federal control due to the incapability of local officials 
to enforce abatement orders in cases of industrial pollution. Tht 
underlying reason for such a preference relates to the improved 
placement of scarce resources and the ensuing rise in income 
levels. In fact, all policy suggestions of economists, including that 
of compensation systems and the exposure of misconceptions, are 
formulated to achieve the same end. That is, the role of economic 
thinkers is to devise schemes which will lead to less pollution and 
greater prosperity. The allocation of water resources is centrally 
important due to the irreplaceable nature of water in the global 
ecosystem and in man's economy. 
-.~­
FOOTNOTES 
'*' Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Southern Missis-
sippi. 
1 At its inception in 1965, this agency was given the title Federal 
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Water Pollution Control Administration, later named Federal Water 
Quality Administration, and in 1971 became the Water Quality Office 
of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
2 For an excellent justification of this type of bargaining, see R. H. 
Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. 3 (Oct., 1960). 
3 See, for instance, U.S., Congress. Committee on Public Works. 
Water Pollution-1967) Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st Session, Washington, 
D.C., 1967. 
4 P. L. 89-234 (Water Quality Act of 1965) Sec. 5. Also see U.S., 
Department of the Interior, Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality 
Standards for Interstate Waters, Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, January, 1967. 
5 P. L. 89-753 (Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966) Sec. 2, 3. The 
most recent version of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, P. L. 
92-500, was passed over President Nixon's veto on October 18, 1972. 
6 U.S., Congress. Committee on Public Works. Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act-1966. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, 
D.C., 1966. 
7 The role of economists is difficult to define and is not universally 
agreed upon by my colleagues. Examples of disagreements among mem-
bers of the profession are contained in a debate which appeared in this 
journal. See R. C. d'Arge and E. K. Hunt, "Environmental Pollution, 
Externalities, and Conventional Economic Wisdom: A Critique," En-
vironmental Affairs) Vol. 1, No.2 (June 1971). Also see W. Brown and 
M. Reynolds, "d'Arge and Hunt on Externalities and Economic Ortho-
doxy: A Critique Appraised," Environmental Affairs) Vol. 1, No.4 
(March, 1972). 
826 U.S.C. §I69. See P. R. McDaniel and A. S. Kapiinsky, The Use 
of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat Air and Water Pollution: 
A Case Study in Tax Expenditures) Environmental Affairs) Vol. 1, No.1 
(April, 1971). 
9 Brown and Reynolds, supra note 7 at 842. 
10 It should be noted that such absolute liability for damage resultant 
from oil spills is contemplated in both versions of the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, supra n.5. 
